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Abstract
A wide variety of online platforms use digital badges to encourage users to take certain types of
desirable actions. However, despite their growing popularity, their causal effect on users’ behavior is not
well understood. This is partly due to the lack of counterfactual data and the myriad of complex factors
that influence users’ behavior over time. As a consequence, their design and deployment lacks general
principles.
In this paper, we focus on first-time badges, which are awarded after a user takes a particular type
of action for the first time, and study their causal effect by harnessing the delayed introduction of
several badges in a popular Q&A website. In doing so, we introduce a novel causal inference framework
for first-time badges whose main technical innovations are a robust survival-based hypothesis testing
procedure, which controls for the heterogeneity in the benefit users obtain from taking an action, and a
bootstrap difference-in-differences method, which controls for the random fluctuations in users’ behavior
over time. Our results suggest that first-time badges steer users’ behavior if the initial benefit a user
obtains from taking the corresponding action is sufficiently low, otherwise, we do not find significant
effects. Moreover, for badges that successfully steered user behavior, we perform a counterfactual analysis
and show that they significantly improved the functioning of the site at a community level.
1 Introduction
In recent years, social media sites and online communities have increasingly relied on digital badges to reward
their users for different types of online behavior. Similarly as their physical counterpart, digital badges have
been used both as a reputation mechanism, summarizing the skills and accomplishments of the users who
receive them, and as an incentive mechanism, encouraging users to take certain type of desirable actions.
The promise of digital badges is that automated fine-grained monitoring and greater degree of control will
help refine their design as incentive mechanisms, increasing users’ engagement and improving the functioning
of the corresponding online platform. However, to fulfill this promise, it is necessary to better understand
their causal effect on the online behavior of the users who may receive them—identify when and why they
are (not) able to steer their behavior.
In this paper, we focus on first-time badges, which are awarded after a user takes a particular type of action
for the first time. First-time badges are the simplest type of the highly popular threshold badges [4, 28, 35],
which are awarded after a user has taken an action a pre-specified number of times. More specifically, we study
the causal effect induced by first-time badges by harnessing several natural experiments in Stack Overflow1, a
popular Q&A website, consisting of the delayed introduction of a badge some time after the site’s inception.
Despite their simplicity, we need to tackle several challenges, which require careful reasoning:
∗This work was done during Tomasz Kusmierczyk’s internship at the Max Planck Institute for Software Systems.
1https://stackoverflow.com
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— Measuring progress towards the badge: since first-time badges are awarded after performing just one
single action, the action count does not provide a direct measure of progress towards the badge. This is in
contrast with (non-binary) threshold badges, which were typically the focus of previous work [4, 28, 35].
— Utility heterogeneity: the benefit (or utility) each user obtains from taking an action differs wildly due
to, e.g., user’s intrinsic motivation, the target of the action, or other users’ actions. As a consequence, the
times users take to perform an action for the first time spans a large range of values.
— Random temporal changes: one can frequently observe random fluctuations in users’ behavior over
time due to many different complex factors. As a consequence, to assess the strength of the causal effect
induced by a badge, it is necessary to control for these random fluctuations.
We address the above mentioned challenges by developing a novel causal inference framework for first-time
badges, especially designed for our problem setting. Our framework avoids modeling the mechanisms underlying
individual user actions and instead adopts a data-driven approach based on survival analysis and statistical
hypothesis testing. At the heart of our approach there are two technical innovations: (i) a robust survival-based
hypothesis testing procedure, which allows us to account for the utility heterogeneity, and (ii) a bootstrap
difference-in-differences method, inspired by the economics literature on natural experiments [23, 25, 31],
which allows us to control for the random fluctuations in users’ behavior over time. Moreover, while our
framework focuses on first-time badges, we argue that our methodological innovations will also shed light on
more complex badges, e.g., non-binary threshold badges.
In contrast with recent empirical studies on threshold badges [4, 28, 29, 35], which typically assume or
conclude that, to some degree, badges always steer users’ behavior, we do not find statistically significant
evidence to back up this conclusion in all the first-time badges we considered. Instead, we provide empirical
evidence of a more subtle picture. In particular, our results suggest that first-time badges steer users’ behavior
if the utility a user obtains from taking the corresponding action is sufficiently low, otherwise, the badge does
not seem to have a significant effect. Moreover, we hypothesize that this may be also the case for non-binary
threshold badges and thus argue that the user utilities should be carefully considered on the design and
deployment of badges. Finally, for badges that successfully steered user behavior, we go a step further and,
using a survival-based counterfactual analysis, show that they significantly improve the functioning of the
site at a community level.
Related work. Our work contributes to the growing literature on badges [2, 4, 7, 19, 35, 28, 29, 12, 5],
which can be broadly divided into theoretical and empirical studies.
Theoretical studies on badges [19, 35, 12] analyze the effect of badges on users’ behavior under stylized
models of badges, which make strong assumptions, often without empirical support. Moreover, they typically
ignore the inherent utility a user receives from taking the action the badge rewards—the action payoff and cost.
In contrast, in our work, we avoid making strong assumptions about the mechanisms underlying individual
user actions and instead adopt a data-driven approach, which enable us to account for the utility a user
obtains from taking an action.
Empirical studies on badges [2, 4, 7, 28, 29, 5] have mainly focused on threshold badges, where the
action count provides a direct measure of progress towards the badge. In this context, several authors [28, 4]
have provided empirical evidence in favor of the goal-gradient hypothesis, which posits users increase their
engagement as they get closer to earning a badge, while other authors [2, 5] found that degree of success of a
badge may depend on different complex factors. However, most of these studies did not have access to control
groups, which would have allowed them to assess users’ behavior in the absence of a badge and control for
random fluctuations in users’ behavior over time. A notable exception is by Bornfeld et al. [7], which has
been concurrently and independently conducted with our work, and it also leverages natural experiments in
the context of badges. However, in contrast to our work, they rely on standard statistical tests on aggregated
counts, account for the temporal fluctuations in users’ behavior in an ad-hoc manner, and ignore the utility
heterogeneity across users.
Moreover, badges can be viewed as a gamification mechanism, i.e., a mechanism in which game-design
elements are used in a non-gaming environment to encourage users to perform certain tasks [10, 32]. Therefore,
our research adds up to the existing studies on practical implications of gamification for, e.g., increasing
user engagement in learning [16, 15] and e-learning [13, 27], shaping healthy behavioral patterns [14, 24, 21],
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Figure 1: Time when users first edited a tag wiki (user action time, t) against time when they became eligible
to edit tag wikis (user start time, s). The horizontal black line denotes the time when the Tag editor badge
was introduced, which is awarded after a user edits a tag wiki for the first time.
systems design [17] or crowdsourcing [26].
Finally, natural experiments [25, 31], difference-in-difference designs [11, 23] and propensity score match-
ing [9, 33] have been increasingly used to identify causal effects from observational data in online settings,
e.g., social influence [6, 3, 8, 22] or network formation [20, 30]. However, together with Bornfeld et al. [7], the
present work is one of the first that leverage natural experiments to quantify causal effects in the context of
badges.
2 Data description
Our Stack Overflow dataset2 comprises of all individual timestamped actions performed by all users from the
site’s inception from July 31, 2008 to September 14, 2014, which allow us to track the complete sequence of
actions users take.
First-time badges: natural experiments. There are a great variety of badges, which reward users for
different types of behaviors. In this work, we focus on first-time badges, which are awarded after a user takes
a particular type of action for the first time, and identify those that were introduced some time after the
site’s inception. The delayed introduction of these badges can be thought of as natural experiments [25, 31],
where the treatment of earning a badge is assigned as if random among users. Figure 1 illustrates an example
of such badge.
More specifically, we select three first-time badges that reward actions whose utilities to the users are
clearly different:
— Tag Editor badge: Stack Overflow users can include tags on questions (or answers) to concisely
describe their content. In July 2010, Stack Overflow enabled the creation of tag wikis by the community,
which aim to provide a description of all used tags. Shortly afterwards, it introduced a badge called Tag
Editor, awarded after a user edits a tag wiki for the first time, to encourage users to edit tag wikis. To
ensure the quality of the wiki tags, only users with at least a reputation level of 1,500 could (initially) edit a
tag wiki3. Finally, note that a user obtains a low utility from editing a wiki tag—it requires some effort and
she only receives the intangible reward of helping the community. Moreover, the more uncommon a tag is,
the least this intangible reward may be since she will help a smaller part of the community.
— Promoter badge: When a Stack Overflow user does not receive a satisfactory answer to one of her
questions, she can offer a bounty to reward, in the form of reputation points, the user who would provide
such a satisfactory answer4. In July 2010, Stack Overflow introduced a badge called Promoter, awarded after
a user offers a bounty for an answer to one of her questions for the first time, to encourage users to offer
more bounties. Only users with at least a reputation of 75 points can offer a bounty. In contrast with editing
2Publicly available at https://archive.org/details/stackexchange
3In February 2011, Stack Overflow lowered the minimum reputation level to 100 and thus the characteristics of the population that
could earn the badge changed. Therefore, in our analysis, we only consider data up to January 2010.
4A user can also offer a bounty to a user after she has provided an answer, as a thank you gift, however, that usage is rarer.
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Table 1: General statistics on the number of users and actions in our dataset. The time when a badge is
introduced is denoted by τ , the time when a user becomes eligible to perform an action is denoted by su and
the time when a user performs the action is denoted by tu.
Tag Editor∗ Investor Promoter
Required reputation 1,500 75 75
Eligible users, su < τ 6,396 46,148 46,148
Actions, tu < τ 93 4,984 205
Eligible users, su ≥ τ 2,095 297,481 297,481
Actions, tu ≥ τ 471 30,396 7,830
∗For Tag Editor badge we present statistic only until 2011-02-09
when the required reputation changed.
a wiki tag, a user obtains a high utility from offering a bounty—it requires little effort and she may receive
an answer to a question she is personally interested in, however, it entails a cost in terms of the reputation
she transfers to the user providing the answer.
— Investor badge: Stack Overflow users can also offer bounties to receive a satisfactory answer to a
question that has been asked by another user. In July 2010, Stack Overflow introduced a first-time badge
called Investor to encourage users to offer more bounties for answers to other users’ questions. Similarly as
in the Promoter badge, only users with at least a reputation of 75 points can offer a bounty for an answer to
a question asked by another user. However, in this case, a user may obtain a lower utility from offering a
bounty for an answer to another user’s question than her own—on the one hand, she may be less interested
in an answer since she did not originally ask the question and, on the other hand, the question may have
already a (relatively) satisfactory answer when she found it.
Table 1 provides general statistics on the number of eligible users and user actions in our dataset.
3 Testing the effectiveness of badges
In this section, we first formalize the problem setting, which includes at its core a natural experiment. Then,
we introduce our causal inference framework for first-time badges, discussing the assumptions it requires and
elaborating on its individual components. Finally, we evaluate its effectiveness using a variety of synthetic
experiments and conclude with a discussion of its limitations.
Problem setting. Given an action of interest a, we record the behavior of each user during an observation
window [0, T ] as a tuple
e := (
start time
↓
su, tu
↑
action time
,
utility
↓
vu ), (1)
which means that user u becomes eligible5 to perform the action at time su, she performs the action at time
tu, with tu ≥ su, and obtains a utility vu, which is often intangible. If a user does not perform the action
during the observation window [0, T ], we set the action time to tu =∞, however, this does not imply she
will never perform the action. Moreover, we assume a first-time badge b is introduced at time τ ∈ (0, T ] to
incentivize users to take action a. That means, after time τ , a user receives badge b the first time she takes
action a, potentially increasing its corresponding utility vu. Here, the delayed introduction of badge b at
time τ can be thought of as a natural experiment [25, 31], where the treatment of earning a badge is assigned
as if random among users who are eligible to perform an action. Note that users who performed action a
before the badge introduction time τ receive the badge automatically at τ , however, this does not influence
our analysis since our focus is on the potential effect that first-time badges may have on the first time users
take the action, and not on subsequent times.
5Stack Overflow often requires a minimum reputation level for a user to be able to perform an action. For example, only users with
at least a reputation level of 75 can offer a bounty.
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Given the above setup, our goal is then to assess to which extent the introduction of the badge changes
users’ behavior, as measured by the time users take to perform the action for the first time, i.e., tu − su.
Next, we present a high-level overview of our causal inference framework, highlighting the assumption it
requires, and then elaborate on its individual components.
Our causal inference framework. Given an action of interest a, its corresponding first-time badge b
with introduction time τ , the behavior of n users with respect to a, i.e., Da = {(su, tu, vu)}u∈[n], one could
just consider the set of users who performed the action for the first time before the badge introduction, i.e.,
tu < τ , as control group, and the set of users who became eligible to perform the action after the badge
introduction, i.e., τ < su, as treatment group. However, proceeding that way would have several limitations.
First, a potential difference among the treatment and control groups could be due to random fluctuations
in users’ behavior over time due to many complex, confounding factors. Second, one would be unable to
consider users who became eligible before the badge introduction but performed the action for the first time
after the badge introduction. These users are the ones who were actually exposed to the badge introduction.
Our causal inference framework overcomes the above limitations by redefining the treatment and control
groups as follows. We define the treatment group as the set of users who became eligible to perform the
action at a time su ∈ [τ −w/2, τ +w/2], where w ≥ 0 is a given parameter. We define several control groups,
each of them associated to a virtual badge bi introduced at time τi ∈ [w/2, τ − w] ∪ [τ + w, T − w/2], picked
uniformly at random. Under these definitions, the treatment group represents the true world where the badge
is introduced and the control groups represent different counterfactual worlds where a virtual badge, which
models random fluctuation in users’ behavior, is introduced. As long as the allocation of users across the
treatment and control groups resemble random assignment, if the strength of the change induced by the
badge in the true world (as measured by survival-based hypothesis testing) is larger than the strength of the
changes induced by the virtual badges in a variety of counterfactual worlds, we can conclude that the change
in the true world is not due to random fluctuation in users’ behavior with higher confidence.
Next, we elaborate on two survival-based hypothesis testing procedures of increasing statistical power,
which we use to measure the strength of the change induced by a (true or virtual) badge, and then describe
how to formally compare the strength of the changes induced by the true and the virtual badges by means of
a novel bootstrap difference in differences method.
— Basic survival-based hypothesis testing: Given an action of interest a, we model the time tu when a user u
takes action a using a survival process [1]. Following the literature on temporal point processes, we represent
such survival process as a binary counting process Nu(t) ∈ {0, 1}, which becomes one when the user performs
the action for the first time. Then, we characterize this counting process using its corresponding intensity
λu(t), i.e., E[dNu(t)] = λu(t)dt, which we define as follows:
λu(t) =

0 if t < su
λ0 if su ≤ t < τ
λ1 otherwise
(2)
where su is the time when user u becomes eligible to perform action a, τ is the time when the first-time badge
is introduced, and λ0 and λ1 are parameters shared across all users, which depend on the (intangible) utility
users obtain from taking the action for the first time before and after the badge introduction, respectively.
Under this model, the null hypothesis H0, i.e., the badge did not have an effect, corresponds to λ0 = λ1 ≥ 0
and the alternative hypothesis H1 is λ0 6= λ1 with λ0 ≥ 0 and λ1 ≥ 0. Moreover, given the behavior of n
users, the maximum likelihood estimators of the model parameters, λˆ0 and λˆ1, can be computed analytically.
In particular, under the null hypothesis, they are readily given by:
λˆ0 = λˆ1 =
∑
u∈[n] I(tu ≤ T )∑
u∈[n](min(tu, T )− su)
, (3)
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and under the alternative hypothesis, they are given by:
λˆ0 =
∑
u∈[n] I(tu ≤ τ)∑
u∈[n](min(tu, τ)− su)I(su < τ)
λˆ1 =
∑
u∈[n] I(τ < tu ≤ T )∑
u∈[n](min(tu, T )− τ)I(tu > τ)
, (4)
where I(·) is the indicator function and all the sums are over eligible users. Then, we can use a test statistic
such as standard log-likelihood ratio (LLR) [18] to measure the strength of the change induced by the badge,
i.e.,
LLR =
∑
u∈[n]:tu<T
log f(su, tu; λˆ0, λˆ1)− log f(su, tu; λˆ0)
+
∑
u∈[n]:tu=∞
logS(su, T ; λˆ0, λˆ1)− logS(su, T ; λˆ0)
where f(su, tu; λˆ0) and f(su, tu; λˆ0, λˆ1) are the likelihoods of the action times under the null and alternative
model, respectively, and S(su, T ; λˆ0, λˆ1) and S(su, T ; λˆ0) are the corresponding survival functions. Here, the
likelihoods and survivals can be computed using the intensity λu(t) defined by Eq. 2, with λ0 = λ1 for the
null model and λ0 6= λ1 for the alternative model, as noted elsewhere [1].
— Robust survival-based hypothesis testing: The basic survival-based hypothesis testing procedure described
above assumes the model parameters are shared across all users and, by doing so, it ignores the utility
heterogeneity across users. Here, we account for the utility heterogeneity by considering different latent
parameters per user, but sampled from the same distributions, i.e.,
λu(t) =

0 if t < su
λ0(u) if su ≤ t < τ
λ1(u) otherwise
λ0(u) ∼ Gamma(k0, r)
λ1(u) ∼ Gamma(k1, r) (5)
where su is the time when user u becomes eligible to perform action a, τ is the time when the first-time
badge is introduced, k0, k1 are shape parameters and r is a rate parameter. Here, note that E[λ0] = k0/r and
E[λ1] = k1/r.
Then, we define the null and alternative hypothesis in terms of the shape parameters, i.e.,
H0 : k0 = k1 ≥ 0
H1 : k0 6= k1, k0 ≥ 0, k1 ≥ 0
Moreover, given the behavior of n users, we can estimate the shape parameters using maximum likelihood
estimation, integrating out the latent parameters λ0(u) and λ1(u), and estimate the rate parameter by cross
validation. More specifically, under the null hypothesis, the shape parameters are given by:
kˆ0 = kˆ1 = −
∑
u∈[n] I(tu ≤ T )∑
u∈[n] log
(
r
r+min(tu,T )−su
) (6)
and under the alternative hypothesis, they are given by:
kˆ0 = −
∑
u∈[n] I(tu ≤ τ)∑
u∈[n] log
(
r
r+min(tu,τ)−su
)
I(su ≤ τ)
kˆ1 = −
∑
u∈[n] I(τ < tu ≤ T )∑
u∈[n] log
(
r
r+min(tu,T )−τ
)
I(tu > τ)
(7)
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Figure 2: Our bootstrap difference-in-difference method. The treatment group (left) consists of users whose
start time su lies in a window of size w around the time τ the badge is introduced. Each control group i
(right) consists of users whose start time su lies in a window of size w around the time τi a virtual badge is
introduced. The method runs hypothesis testing on both the treatment group and all control groups and
then compares the test statistic (e.g., LLR) of the treatment group with the empirical distribution of the test
statistic of the control groups.
Similarly as in the basic survival model, we can then use a test statistic such as standard log-likelihood
ratio (LLR) to measure the strength of the change induced by the badge.
— Bootstrap difference-in-differences method: Given an action of interest a, its corresponding first-time
badge b with introduction time τ , the behavior of n users with respect to a, i.e., Da = {(su, tu, vu)}u∈[n], and
a model-based hypothesis testing procedure as the ones described above, we assess the significance of the
change induced by the true badge using the following bootstrap difference-in-difference method:
I. We select all users whose start time su ∈ [τ − w/2, τ + w/2], where w ≥ 0 is a given parameter, as
treatment group. Then, we compute the maximum likelihood estimators of the parameters of the model
of choice using Eqs. 3-4 (basic) or Eqs. 6-7 (robust) on that subset of users and use these estimated
parameters to compute the log-likelihood ratio, LLR.
II. We introduce a set of virtual badges V at a times τi ∈ [w/2, τ − w] ∪ [τ + w, T − w/2], picked uniformly
at random (in practice, one can use a sliding window), where w ≥ 0 is the same given parameter as in the
first step. Then, for each virtual badge i ∈ V , we select users whose start time su ∈ [τi−w/2, τi+w/2] as
control group i. Finally, we compute the maximum likelihood estimators of the parameters of the model
of choice, as in the previous step, on each of these subsets of users and use these estimated parameters
to compute the log-likelihood ratio for each control group, LLRτi .
III. We measure the strength of the change induced by the badge by means of the probability that the LLR
of the control groups, for which the null hypothesis holds by design since virtual badges do not exist, is
larger than the LLR of the treatment group, p := FLLR(LLRτ ).
The above bootstrap difference-in-differences method, which we also illustrate in Figure 2, equips us with a
robust empirical estimate of the distribution of the LLR under the null hypothesis FLLR(LLR) and a p-value
p = FLLR(LLRτ ), which accounts for the temporal fluctuations in users’ behavior and allows us to reject the
null hypothesis with higher confidence. Finally, as discussed previously, the main assumption needed for the
above method to be valid is that the allocation of users across the treatment and control groups resemble
random assignment. Table 2 shows this assumption is satisfied in our dataset, as we will discuss later.
Framework evaluation. In this section, we compare the effectiveness of the basic survival model with
the theoretical distribution of the LLR under the null hypothesis (χ21, given by Wilks’ theorem [34]; “basic
theoretical”) and the basic and robust survival models with the empirical distribution (FLLR) of the LLR
under the null hypothesis, as estimated by the proposed difference-in-differences bootstrap method (“basic
bootstrap” and “robust bootstrap”, respectively). More specifically, we proceed as follows.
First, we simulate the behavior of n = 10,000 users during a time interval [0, T ], where T = 360. For each
user, we draw her starting times su ∼ U [0, T ], and her action time t from an intensity λu(t)(1 + at), where
λu(t) is given by Eq. 5 and a = 0.001. Note that the term (1 + at) imposes a global linear trend, which is
7
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
effect strength, E(∆P )
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
p-
va
lu
e
p=0.05
basic theoretic
basic bootstrap
robust bootrsap
Average p-value
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
effect strength, E(∆P )
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
H
0
re
je
ct
io
n
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
p=0.05
basic theoretic
basic bootstrap
robust bootrsap
Rejection probability
Figure 3: Performance of our causal inference framework on synthetic data. The left panel shows the average
p-value against expected effect strength E[∆P ], where lower (higher) is better for E[∆P ] > 0 (E[∆P ] ≈ 0).
The right panel informs about tests’ statistical power by showing the rejection probability of the null hypothesis
H0 at p = 0.05 against effect strength E[∆P ], where higher (lower) is better for E[∆P ] > 0 (E[∆P ] ≈ 0).
often observed in real data6. Moreover, in Eq. 5, we set the badge introduction time to τ = T/2, the rate
parameter to r = 10, and consider different badge strength values expressed as the expected increase in the
probability that users perform the action in less than t = 10 after su, which we denote as E[∆P ]. For each
configuration, we run 100 independent simulations.
Then, we run the above methods (“basic theoretical”, “basic bootstrap”, and “robust bootstrap”) on data
from each of the independent simulations and measure their effectiveness in terms of two metrics: average
p-value and rejection probability of the null hypothesis H0 at p = 0.05. Figure 3 summarizes the results,
which show that the robust bootstrap has a superior performance: it is more likely to reject H0 when a badge
is introduced (i.e., E[∆P ] > 0) while it is equally likely not to reject H0 when a badge is not introduced (i.e.,
E[∆P ] ≈ 0).
Remarks. We acknowledge that our framework has several limitations. In its current form, the framework is
only applicable to first-time badges. In principle, it may be possible to augment our framework to other types
of badges. For example, in threshold badges, one could replace the binary counting processes by non binary
ones representing the number of actions N(t) (i.e., progress) and choose a functional form for the intensities
depending on the numbers of actions, i.e., λ1(N(t)), as suggested in previous work [4]. However, one would
need to address additional challenges, e.g., accurate intensity models, and it is out of the scope of this work.
Moreover, while our bootstrap difference-in-difference method does control for temporal fluctuations in the
users’ behavior, it cannot rule out the possibility that the change in users’ behavior in the treatment group, if
deemed significant, may be due to a hidden confounding factor rather than the badge introduction.
4 Do badges work?
Before we apply our causal inference framework to the three first-time badges described in Section 2, we
first check the random assignment assumption between the treatment and control groups, which is necessary
for our framework to provide sound conclusions. If the assignment is random, we would expect the groups
(respective subpopulations) to be indistinguishable based on any additional covariates. Two groups are
called indistinguishable (or balanced) if these additional covariates are within a standardized mean difference
(SMD)7 of 0.25 standard deviations [33]. In particular, Table 2 shows that treatment and control groups are
indistinguishable in our dataset. Here, we would like to acknowledge that conclusions drawn from standardized
mean differences (SMD) when evaluating variables with skewed distributions, as ours, should be taken with
caution.
6We obtain quantitatively similar results in the absence of a linear trend, i.e., a = 0.
7The standardized mean difference (SMD) is defined as the difference in means of the treatment and control group divided by the
pooled standard deviation of both groups.
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Table 2: Absolute Standardized Mean Difference (|SMD|) between the treatment and the control groups.
Tag Editor Prom. & Inv.
feature ¯|SMD| σ|SMD| ¯|SMD| σ|SMD|
age 0.10 0.04 0.14 0.10
age-NA∗ 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.11
reputation 0.21 0.35 0.14 0.11
#views 0.16 0.23 0.11 0.08
#upvotes 0.18 0.28 0.13 0.10
#downvotes 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.02
∗Balance check on a binary variable indicating if the value is missing.
Once we have validated the random assignment assumption, we apply our causal framework to the three
first-time badges. Figure 4 summarizes the results by means of:
(i) Test statistic over time for the basic and robust survival models, i.e., LLRτi and LLRτ against τi and τ .
(ii) Empirical distribution of the test statistic under H0 and p-value for the robust survival model, i.e.,
FLLR(LLR) and FLLR(LLRτ ).
(iii) Average intensities for first-time action under robust survival model, i.e., kˆ0 before τ and kˆ1 after τ ,
using a sliding window of length w = 60 days.
Overall, the results suggest that the Tag editor and Investor badges were successful—they had a significant
causal effect on users’ behavior (p = 0.004 and p = 0.017, respectively). In contrast, the Promoter badge was
unsuccessful—it did not have a significant causal effect (p = 0.309). Moreover, a detailed analysis also reveals
several interesting insights.
First, the actions rewarded by the two successful badges were rare by the time the badges got introduced.
For example, in the case of the Tag editor badge, only 100 tag wiki edits had been performed, however,
there were ∼6,500 users who were eligible to perform edits. In the case of the Investor badge, only 40
bounties had been offered for an answer to other users’ questions. In contrast, the action rewarded by the
Promoter badge—offering a bounty for an answer to the users’ own questions—was much more common by
the time the badge got introduced. As a consequence, the average intensity for the Promoter badge was an
order of magnitude higher than the intensities corresponding to the Tag editor or the Investor badge.
Second, the introduction of the Tag editor and Investor badges was followed by an increase on the
average intensity of the corresponding first-time action of more than 4×, from kˆ0 ≤ 2 · 10−4 to kˆ1 ≈ 8 · 10−4
for Tag editor badge and from kˆ0 ≤ 5 · 10−5 to kˆ1 ≈ 2 · 10−4 for Investor badge. Equivalently, the average
time a user takes to perform the actions for the first time was reduced by 75%. Moreover, this change in user
behavior did not vanish over time (rightmost column).
Finally, in the case of the Investor badge, we find a transient increase on the average intensity of bounties
to other users’ questions around October-November 2010, which is statistically significant. Upon investigation,
we notice that several users discovered ways of benefiting from offering bounties around that time, triggering
subsequent first-time uses of bounties by other users8. Such discussions led to an increase on the minimum
reputation one can transfer when offering a bounty.
5 Badges and utilities
In this section, we look for plausible reasons that explain why the Tag editor and Investor badges were
successful at steering users’ behavior while the Promoter badge was unsuccessful. To this aim, we resort to
game-theoretic concepts such as user utilities, action payoffs and reservation values, and identify measurable
proxies of some of these concepts.
User utilities. In the game theory literature [12, 19, 35], the utility a user obtains from performing an
action is defined as the difference between the action payoff p and the cost of effort c, i.e., v = p− c. Moreover,
the fact that participation is a voluntary, strategic choice—users have a choice about whether to perform
8https://meta.stackexchange.com/questions/64824/clever-bounty-reputation-hack
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Figure 4: Causal effect of three badges (Tag Editor, Promoter and Investor) on users’ behavior. Panels in
the left show the test statistic (log-likelihood ratio; LLR) over time for the basic and robust survival models,
i.e., LLRτi and LLRτ against τi and τ . Panels in the middle show the empirical distribution of the test
statistic (LLR) under the null hypothesis H0 and p-value for the robust survival model, i.e., FLLR(LLR) and
p = FLLR(LLRτ ). Panels in the right show the average intensities for first-time action under robust survival
model, i.e., kˆ0 before τ and kˆ1 after τ , using a sliding window of length w = 60 days. The results suggest
that the Tag editor and Investor badges were successful and the Promoter badge was unsuccessful.
an action—is often modeled via a reservation value ω that the utility v must exceed in order for the user
to perform the action. More specifically, if p − c < w, the user will decide not to perform the action and,
otherwise, she will perform it. In this context, a badge b is assumed to increase the utility a user obtains from
performing the action, i.e., v = p− c+ vb, where vb is the badge value. Then, depending on the actual values
of p, c, vb and ω, one can argue that a badge will induce users to perform an action that, in the absence of a
badge, would not perform.
However, in social media sites and online communities, the action payoffs, cost of effort, badge value and
reservation values are typically intangible, hidden or ambiguously defined. As a consequence, our causal
inference framework did not explicitly adopt the above model and instead used a data-driven approach based
on survival analysis using only the observable temporal traces. In this section, however, we turn our attention
towards the above stylized model, try to identify measurable proxies of the model parameters for each of the
studied badges and actions and use them to investigate the plausible reasons for the success or failure of
badges at steering users’ behavior, as concluded by our framework.
Proxies to user utilities. We consider the following observable proxies for the utilities users obtain from
editing a wiki tag and offering a bounty, respectively:
(a) Tag popularity : the more popular a tag is, the greater the utility v a user may obtain from editing
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Figure 5: Causal effect of the Tag Editor badge for tags with different utility value, as estimated by their
popularity level.
its wiki tag—the user needs to put less effort to create a wiki on a popular tag and she receives the
satisfaction of helping a larger part of the community.
(b) Number of answers : the higher (lower) the number of answers a question receives after (before) offering
a bounty, the greater the utility v a user obtains from offering the bounty. Moreover, users offering a
bounty for an answer to another user’s question may obtain less utility from the answers since they
did not originally ask the question. Here, note that we did not find a correlation between the bounty
value—its cost—and the final number of answers (ρ ≈ 0.1) and thus we can safely ignore the bounty
value.
Given the above proxies, we proceeds as follows. In terms of tag wikis, we group tags by popularity (i.e.,
number of questions a tag was used on) and model the time the users take to create a wiki for a tag of a
given popularity p as a survival process. Moreover, we characterize this process using an intensity λp(t),
which we define as follows:
λp(t) =

0 if t < s
λ0(p) if s ≤ t < τ
λ1(p) otherwise
(8)
where λ0(p) and λ0(p) are parameters shared across all tags with popularity p, s is the time when the tag is
first used in a question, and τ is the time when the Tag Editor badge is introduced. Then, by comparing
the maximum likelihood estimators of the model parameters, λˆ0(p) and λˆ1(p), for different popularity levels
p, we can assess the causal effect of the Tag Editor badge on tag wikis with different utility values.
In terms of bounties, we first group questions by the number of answers they received in the first two
days since they were asked and then compare the additional number of answers they received after those first
two days if a bounty was (not) offered in the second day. Moreover, for questions that received a bounty, we
estimate the distribution of the number of answers they received before the bounty was offered both before
and after the badges Promoter and Investor were introduced. By controlling for the number of answers, we
can assess the causal effect of both badges for bounties with different utility values.
Results. Figure 5 summarizes the results for the Tag Editor badge, which shows the higher the popularity
(utility) of a tag, the weaker the causal effect of the badge introduction. For example, while the intensity
of the tags at the bottom 50% in terms of popularity increased an order of magnitude after the badge was
introduced, the intensity of the tags at the top 1% did not change. This suggests that the introduction of the
badge steered users to create tag wikis for less popular, low utility tags.
Figure 6 summarizes the results for the Promoter and Investor badges, which let us better understand
their failure and success, respectively: (i) the number of answers a bounty triggers (i.e., its utility) increases
with the number of answers the question has received in its absence (top panel); (ii) the introduction of the
Promoter badge changed the users’ willingness to offer bounties to their own questions only up to a very
small degree (top panel, top figure), whereas the Investor badge did change it remarkably for bounties
offered to other users’ questions (bottom panel, bottom figure). In both cases, the change is statistically
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Figure 6: Causal effect of the Promoter and Investor badges for bounties with different utility value, as
estimated by the number of answers preceding the bounty offering.
significant, i.e., χ2 = 86.2, p < 0.001 for Promoter and χ2 = 114.9, p < 0.001 for Investor badge using
Mood’s median test, however, only the latter was sufficiently pointed to result in a significant change at an
individual user level, as concluded in Section 4.
Remarks. For the specific actions and badges under studied, we were able to manually identify sensible
proxies of the users’ utilities, however, finding sensible proxies for other types of actions in Stack Overflow or
other online platforms will require careful reasoning and justification.
6 Do badges improve the community functioning?
In this section, we use a survival-based counterfactual analysis, in which we investigate what would have
happened if the Tag Editor and Investor badges had not been introduced, to assess to which extent the
badges improved the site functioning at a community level.
Counterfactual analysis. For the Tag editor, we assess the site functioning at a community level in
terms of the number of new tag wikis over time and, for the Investor badges, we use the time to bounty
and time to first answer across questions. More specifically, we proceed as follows.
— New tag wikis : we simulate the time the users take to create a new wiki for a tag of a given popularity
p in the counterfactual world where the Tag editor badge is never introduced using the intensity defined
by Eq. 8 with λ0(p) = λ1(p) = λˆ0(p), where λˆ0(p) is the maximum likelihood estimate for λ0(p) in the true
world. Then, we compare the number of new tag wikis over time as well as the popularity of their associated
wikis in the true world and in the simulated counterfactual world.
— Time to bounty and first answer : for questions that received a bounty, we model the time that the
users take to offer the bounty as a survival process with associated intensity λb(t), which we define as follows:
λb(t) =

0 if t < s
λ0(b) if s ≤ t < τ
λ1(b) otherwise
(9)
where the parameter b ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether the badge is offered by the user asking the question or by
another user, {λi(b)}i,b∈{0,1} are (four) parameters shared across all questions, s is the time since two days
after the question is asked9, and τ is the time when the Promoter and Investor badges are introduced. For
all questions, we model the time that the users take to provide the first answer also as a survival process
with an associated intensity defined similarly as in Eq. 9, however, in this case, the parameter b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
denotes whether the question received a badge and, if so, whether it was offered by the user asking the
question or by another user, and thus the model has six parameters. Then, we compare the maximum
9A bounty can only be offered two days after the question has been asked.
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Figure 7: Tag wikis with and without the Tag Editor badge. Simulations means and 95%-CI shown.
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Figure 8: Time to bounty and first answer with and without the Promoter and Investor badges.
likelihood estimators of the above parameters to assess what would have happened if the Investor badge
had not been introduced.
Results. Figure 7 summarizes the results for the Tag Editor badge. The top panel shows the number of
unique tags with (blue) and without (green) supporting tag wiki over time in the true and in the simulated
counterfactual world. Note that the number of unique tags without tag wiki grows over time as users ask
questions with new (not previously used) tags. The results show that the tags with supporting tag wikis
increase at a higher rate in the true world than in the counterfactual world just after the badge introduction,
however, after a relatively short period of time, the rate decreased to its original value and match the rate at
which tags with tag wikis grows in the counterfactual world. The bottom panel, which shows a decrease on
the average rank popularity (rank) of the tags with supporting tag wikis, supports the following hypothesis
to explain this phenomenon. The badge lifted the utility value of editing tag wikis, however, this increase
was large enough to exceed the reservation value only for tags of certain popularity. As a consequence, after
these tags had a tag wiki, the effect of the badge diminished.
Figure 8 summarizes the results for the Investor badge, which show that the time to bounty and first
answer for questions in which a bounty was offered by a user different than the user asking the question
decreased (i.e., the intensities increased) after the Investor was introduced, improving the site functioning.
In contrast, the time to first answer (and time to bounty) in questions without bounty (and with a bounty
offered by the user asking the question) increased. The latter observation suggests that the Investor badge
may have mitigated the global slowdown in the time users take to answer questions by motivating more people
to offer bounties faster—in the counterfactual world where the Investor badge had not been introduced, the
site functioning would have actually worsened.
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7 Conclusions
Social media sites and online communities are dynamic environments where users change their behavior
on a daily basis due to many complex factors. As a consequence, assessing the effectiveness of incentive
mechanisms, which are ubiquitous among them, is challenging. In this work, we have focused on one of
the simplest incentive mechanisms—first-time badges—and studied their effectiveness by developing a novel
survival-based causal modeling framework, specially designed to harness the delayed introduction of several
badges in a popular Q&A website.
Our work also opens up many interesting venues for future work. For example, it would be very interesting
to use our framework to analyze badges in other online platforms as well as extend it to other types of badges,
e.g., threshold badges. Badges are typically awarded to all users whose contributions exceed some predefined
values, however, it would be interesting to also consider incentive mechanisms where users compete for a
limited reward. Finally, in this work, we have focused on assessing the causal effect of (first-time) badges. A
natural follow-up would be developing principled, effective methods to optimize their design.
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